Define judicial activism and judicial restraint. Explain the reasons that judges would exercise activism or restraint and tell how Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education were examples of each.
Judicial activism and judicial restraint are opposing approaches to the exercise of judicial power, specifically in the interpretation of the constitution and laws by judges.
Judicial activism refers to the tendency of judges to interpret the constitution and laws more broadly, creatively, and in a way that advances their own personal beliefs or policy preferences. Activist judges believe that the meaning of the constitution and laws evolves over time, adapting to current societal values and needs. In exercising judicial activism, judges may go beyond the plain language of the text, relying on underlying principles, purposes, and societal values to justify their decisions.
Judicial restraint, on the other hand, is an approach to judicial decision-making that emphasizes deference to the original intent of the constitution and laws, as well as the decisions of elected representatives. Judges who exercise judicial restraint generally avoid injecting their own personal beliefs or policy preferences into their decisions, focusing on the plain language of the text and precedent. This approach also involves a reluctance to overturn or challenge the actions of the other branches of government, viewing the judiciary's role as a passive interpreter of the law.
Judges may exercise activism or restraint for various reasons. Some may believe that the constitution and laws must adapt to changing societal values, while others may believe in strict adherence to the original intent of the laws. The choice between activism and restraint may also depend on the case at hand and the specific legal or constitutional issues involved.
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) and Brown v. Board of Education (1954) are prominent examples of judicial activism and judicial restraint, respectively.
Plessy v. Ferguson is an example of judicial activism. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana law requiring racially segregated train cars, arguing that such segregation did not violate the 14th Amendment's guarantee of equal protection under the law. The Court reasoned that as long as the separate facilities were "equal," segregation was constitutionally permissible – a doctrine that became known as "separate but equal." The judges in this case interpreted the 14th Amendment in a way that aligned with the prevailing societal values of racial segregation at the time, asserting their interpretation beyond the explicit language of the constitution.
Brown v. Board of Education, on the other hand, is an example of judicial restraint. In this landmark case, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that racial segregation in public schools was unconstitutional, overruling Plessy v. Ferguson and effectively ending the "separate but equal" doctrine. The Court's decision was based on a thorough examination of the original intent behind the 14th Amendment and the impact of segregation on children's psychological wellbeing. Rather than injecting their personal beliefs, the judges in the Brown case relied on the text, history, and purpose of the constitution, as well as extensive social science evidence, to conclude that segregation in public schools was inherently unequal and violated the equal protection clause.
In conclusion, judicial activism and judicial restraint are two approaches to the exercise of judicial power, influencing how judges interpret the constitution and laws. Plessy v. Ferguson exemplifies judicial activism by upholding racial segregation based on societal values, while Brown v. Board of Education demonstrates judicial restraint by focusing on the original intent and social science evidence to strike down segregation in schools.