The object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power. The most common instance of this is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced . . . .”

Explain how this decision legally interpreted the Constitution prior to the civil rights movement.(1 point)
Responses

The decision used strict constructionism by explaining the federal power to legislate education within state borders.
The decision used strict constructionism by explaining the federal power to legislate education within state borders.

The decision used strict constructionism by refraining from attempting to decipher the intent behind the Fourteenth Amendment.
The decision used strict constructionism by refraining from attempting to decipher the intent behind the Fourteenth Amendment.

The decision used liberal constructionism by citing the precedent of separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
The decision used liberal constructionism by citing the precedent of separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.

The decision used liberal constructionism by interpreting the amendment’s author’s intent to explain the Fourteenth Amendment.

The quoted passage is from the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of racial segregation under a doctrine that came to be known as "separate but equal." The decision essentially interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees equal protection under the law, as not contradictory to state laws mandating racial segregation, so long as the segregated facilities were equal in quality.

The Plessy decision does not strictly fit within the dichotomy of "strict constructionism" versus "liberal constructionism" as those terms are generally understood in constitutional law. Nevertheless, it is more consistent with a form of conservative interpretation in that it upheld existing social and legal practices of segregation rather than expanding the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike those practices down.

In terms of the provided options, while none of them accurately capture the essence of the decision, the closest (though imperfect) is:

The decision used strict constructionism by refraining from attempting to decipher the intent behind the Fourteenth Amendment.

This option is the closest because the Court did not seek to explore a more progressive or broader understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment to encompass social equality. Instead, it took a narrower view, focusing on the idea that the Amendment was meant to apply only to political and legal equality, thus arguably refraining from a deeper examination of the Amendment's broader intent regarding equality. However, the explanation conflates "strict constructionism" with judicial restraint and does not address the underlying support for state-imposed segregation.

The first option is incorrect as it is a repetition of the second and does not relate to the case.

The third and fourth options are incorrect because the Plessy decision did not cite the precedent that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." This opposite idea was, in fact, a key holding of the later case Brown v. Board of Education (1954), which overturned Plessy's "separate but equal" doctrine.

In summary, this response most closely falls under a narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment (akin to strict constructionism), whereby the Court did not extend the equal protection clause to overturn segregationist state laws that purported to offer equal facilities to both races.