The falsifiability and not confirmation is a virtue of scientific theory was established by
Karl Popper, an Austrian philosopher of science, established the principle of falsifiability as a central criterion for distinguishing scientific theories from non-scientific ones. In his 1934 book "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" (also known as "Logik der Forschung" in German), Popper argued that a theory must be potentially falsifiable to be considered scientific.
Popper criticized the idea of verification or confirmation as a means of evaluating scientific theories. He argued that it is not logically possible to verify or confirm a theory conclusively, as there is always the possibility of new evidence that may contradict it in the future. Instead, Popper emphasized the importance of falsification as a crucial test for scientific theories.
According to Popper, a scientific theory should make specific predictions or hypotheses that can be tested empirically. If empirical observations and experiments produce results inconsistent with these predictions, the theory is considered falsified or refuted. Falsifiability, in Popper's view, is what separates scientific theories from non-scientific ones, such as pseudoscience or unfalsifiable claims.
Popper's principle of falsifiability has had a profound influence on the philosophy of science and how we evaluate scientific theories. It emphasizes the importance of critical thinking, empirical testing, and openness to the possibility of falsification in scientific inquiry.