John lodges an appeal in terms of section 27(2) of the Act on 9 March 2009.
The Council informed him of its decision on 5 February 2009. Explain in detail
the statutory method of computation of days (section 4 of the Interpretation
Act) with reference to case law. Has John lodged the appeal in time?
Section 4 of the Interpretation Act provides for the statutory method of computation of days. According to this section, where a period of time is prescribed by a statute for the doing of any act, this period shall be calculated by excluding the first day and including the last day, unless the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or public holiday, in which case the period shall end on the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or public holiday.
In terms of case law, the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of State v Venter and Others (2002) held that the calculation of time in terms of the Interpretation Act is mandatory and applies to all statutory provisions prescribing time limits for the doing of an act unless the statute in question provides for a different method of calculation.
Applying the statutory method of computation of days to John's case, the period for lodging an appeal in terms of section 27(2) of the Act commenced on 6 February 2009 (the day after the Council's decision was communicated to him) and ended on 9 March 2009. The last day for lodging the appeal was a Monday, and therefore, it is included in the computation.
Therefore, John has lodged the appeal within the prescribed period and in compliance with the statutory method of computation of days.
Section 4 of the Interpretation Act deals with the computation of days for determining the timing of actions or events. It provides a statutory method for calculating the number of days between two given dates.
According to section 4, when calculating days, the first day is excluded, and the last day is included unless it is a public holiday, Saturday, or Sunday. In such cases, the following working day is considered the valid final day.
To determine whether John has lodged the appeal in time, we need to apply the statutory method of computation of days as per section 4 and consider any relevant case law.
In terms of the scenario you provided, John lodges an appeal on 9 March 2009, and the Council informed him of its decision on 5 February 2009. To calculate whether the appeal was lodged within the prescribed timeframe, we need to determine the number of days between these two dates, taking into account the exclusion of the first day and potential public holidays, Saturdays, or Sundays.
Using the statutory method, we exclude 5 February 2009 and include 9 March 2009 as the final day. However, we need to consider whether any public holidays, Saturdays, or Sundays fall within this period.
If there are no relevant public holidays, Saturdays, or Sundays within this period, the appeal would be deemed lodged in time. If, however, any such days fall within this calculation, the count would be extended to the following working day.
To provide a more definitive answer and determine whether any public holidays, Saturdays, or Sundays are relevant, additional information such as the jurisdiction, applicable calendar, and corresponding case law would be required.
In summary, without additional information, it is not possible to definitively conclude whether John has lodged the appeal in time based on the provided information. The statutory method and any relevant case law need to be applied, taking into account public holidays, Saturdays, and Sundays, to determine the accurate timeline for lodging the appeal.