Quoting,Summarizing, and Paraphrasing Sources

How so I write a summary for Gun Control Losing Ground with an in-text citation.

  1. 👍 0
  2. 👎 0
  3. 👁 162
  1. Here are some good sites on in-text citations and summary writing.

    http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/560/02/

    http://www.monash.edu.au/lls/llonline/writing/general/essay/sample-essay/index.xml

    http://homepage.smc.edu/reading_lab/writing_a_summary.htm

    http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:-mMrGTx1YWkJ:www.sa.sdsu.edu/dss/summary.pdf+writing+a+summary&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESiDXzyej0VBMTB-Zak-LT3BqBpvUq-YN2fe-7rNgY7Y6r7bBg9e-U3Bdrmmp6xcybKJ4O5zwJct6Oy5vA4j6rWXVD5npfRRMWOQCncKzixPrf9dNTc42ty28s_Sfge8yN9YiSsE&sig=AHIEtbS8Kuw1AeoTVlO1chES482nEkWHtQ

    1. 👍 0
    2. 👎 0
  2. Here are some excellent instructional webpages to help you.

    http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/563/01/

    http://wps.ablongman.com/long_behrens_saw_1/0,5312,86390-,00.html

    (Broken Link Removed)

    How to write an in-text citation depends on whether you are to use MLA or APA format. Let me know which one you have been assigned to use.

    1. 👍 0
    2. 👎 0
  3. I want to learn how to format question task to teach summarizing and paraphrasing.

    1. 👍 0
    2. 👎 0
  4. If I were fierce, and bald, and short of breath,
    I’d live with scarlet Majors at the Base,
    And speed glum heroes up the line to death.
    You’d see me with my puffy petulant face,
    Guzzling and gulping in the best hotel,
    Reading the Roll of Honour. ‘Poor young chap,’
    I’d say—‘I used to know his father well;
    Yes, we’ve lost heavily in this last scrap.’
    And when the war is done and youth stone dead,
    I’d toddle safely home and die—in bed.

    1. 👍 0
    2. 👎 0
  5. The growing literature on Islamophobia is dominated by empirical studies, the
    analysis of media representations and socio-psychological approaches, while many of these
    studies have been valuable in illustrating the range of expressions of Islamophobia; they have
    been less successful in understanding the phenomena, and mapping its relationship with
    other forms of discriminatory practices such as racism and anti-Semitism. This article
    presents a conceptual examination of the category of Islamophobia and the work it is called
    upon to do in contemporary debates, as prelude to a discussion about what a theorization of
    this concept could contribute to the field of social analysis and policy.
    INTRODUCTION
    There is a film that I saw once or twice called Things to Do in Denver When You’re Dead
    (1995). Maybe it was an in-flight movie or on late night TV. What I remember about it,
    though, is the criminal argot that the filmmakers invented for the demimonde characters of
    the movie to use. This decision to invent a new slang always struck me as rather curious,
    since there already exists a rich and well-known slang familiar to audiences of American
    gangster movies.1 So why did the filmmakers think it was worthwhile investing in a new
    vocabulary? The invention of a vocabulary is only useful if it does some work, in other
    words, if it makes some difference to our practice, if it allows us to say and do things that we
    could not do previously. The invention of a gangster argot specific to Things to Do in Denver
    has the effect of placing the movie in a kind of never-never land of crime, turning a rather
    mundane story into something like a parable or a myth, in which Denver is not really an
    identifiable place and the characters not really people. In the world of Things to Do in Denver
    When You’re Dead there is phrase that characters use frequently: “Give it a name…”. This
    phrase is used as means of demanding an answer for any query.
    Islamophobia is a concept that emerges precisely to do the work that categories like
    racism were not doing. It names something that needs to be named. Its continual circulation
    in public debate testifies to ways in which it hints at something that needs to be addressed.
    What it names, of course, remains a matter of dispute. This dispute has two sources:
    philosophical and political. By philosophical I mean that there is lack of clarity about the
    concept of Islamophobia. Any review of the growing literature on Islamophobia will show
    that it is dominated by empirical studies, by analysis of media representations and sociopsychological
    approaches. These ontic studies of Islamophobia do not (and cannot address)
    the ontology of the category. They cannot provide us with a theoretical clarification. By
    political I mean that the dispute about Islamophobia is not due to simply its conceptual lack
    of clarity, but also with the way it appears in a contested field where questions about national
    security, social cohesion and cultural belonging are played out. It is this field in which the
    relationship between national majorities and the post-colonial, ethnically marked minorities
    is being forged.
    12 ISJ 2(1)
    In other words, Islamophobia is rejected not only because there may be a
    disagreement about whether a particular practice or behavior meets the criterion of what
    constitutes Islamophobia, but also because there is a dispute that any such behavior could be
    considered to be Islamophobic, because the concept of Islamophobia lacks any validity. In
    what follows, I want to address what kind of phenomena are brought forth by giving them
    the name of Islamophobia, and what a theorization of this concept could contribute to the
    field of social analysis and policy.
    The tension between policy and philosophy is expressed in a number of ways in
    social sciences: there is the common assertion that policy and philosophy belong to two
    distinct realms in which the abstract reasoning and complicated language of philosophers has
    nothing to add to the work of practical men and women dealing with complex social
    problems.
    In this article I want to focus on one aspect of this general problem: that is, the
    production of “action-able knowledge”, which is knowledge that policy makers, with
    sufficient political will and resources, could use to make things better. This is similar in a way
    to the classic “mirror for princes” literature, which existed in various historical civilizations,
    for example, Hellenic, Sinic and Indic. To give advice to the prince was the province of the
    philosopher, who would educate the prince in how to exercise what could be described as
    something akin to good governance. This conjoining of the speculative with the practical is
    what Aristotle described as phronesis. It is as contribution to phronetic social science that this
    examination of Islamophobia should be seen.2 Specifically, I want to sketch out some of the
    possible ways in which we account for Islamophobia so that the exercise of accounting
    would be a prelude to its reduction.
    DEFINING ISLAMOPHOBIA
    Discussions about the legitimacy of Islamophobia take place in the context of
    various mobilizations and confrontations centered on the figure of the Muslim. These range
    from the series of “moral panics” that seem to regularly sweep over mainly Western
    plutocracies, but also other places in the world in which some cherished universal (or
    Western) values are threatened by the actions of Muslims (or their extremist fringes). These
    are values—such as the freedom of expression, gender equality or tolerance—most often
    brought into play as being threatened by actions of “some” Muslims.3
    As a term, Islamophobia has a number of iterations: more consistently developed in
    French, in the colonial context and around the 1920s in particular. It appears somewhat
    more sporadically as used in English, with the occasional reference, such as Edward Said’s
    1985 reconsideration of Orientalism, before its enduring appearance in 1997 in the
    Runnymede report. The latter makes no reference to its early formulations, giving the
    impression that it is a neologism without any historical depth and completely inspired by the
    contingencies of “race relations” in Britain.4 In particular, the context for the report is given
    as mobilizations against the publication of The Satanic Verses and the emergence of a Muslim
    political subject. Conventional uses of Islamophobia, at least in the Anglophonic world,
    follow the lead of the Runnymede Trust report of 1997. The concept of Islamophobia that
    appeared in its pages was one that was defined in terms of eight constituent parts. These
    components ranged from perceptions of Islam as an unchanging monolith, to the view of its
    inherent violent nature and its fundamental inferiority to the West. Six of the eight
    components refer to Islam, and the other two refer to Muslims. Muslims are seen as subject
    to Islamophobia primarily through the transference of hostility to Islam and the
    13
    naturalization of that hostility. This definition combines insights from the critique of
    Orientalism (in particular the Orientalist characterization of Islam) to ideas of racism in
    Britain that focus on the unjust discriminatory practices directed at ethnically subordinated
    socio-historical groups. It is possible to read in the Runnymede report, a conceptualization
    of Islamophobia as a product of the articulation between Orientalism and racism. The report
    does this by surreptitiously (and perhaps inadvertently) confirming the emergence of new
    political subjectivity into the discourse of British race relations: Muslim. By translating
    hostility to Islam into an hostility against those described as Muslims in contemporary
    society, one can see in the report an implicit recognition of the racialization of Muslims.5
    Scholars of racism had already moved to the understanding that racism was not
    predicated on the existence of race as understood in primarily biological terms, but rather
    that race was the product of the process of racialization. As such, a mix of elements
    including histories, cultures, geographies and bodies were articulated to forge “race” as the
    condition of possibility of the exercise of racism. The radicality of the Runnymede report
    was to point to the way in which religious affiliation could be a sufficient source of group
    formation. In the context of Britain’s ethnoscape, which by the time of the publication of
    the report had come to be organized around three principal subject positions—White, Black
    and Asian—the introduction of a Muslim identity was disruptive. Muslims could be found
    along all the spectrum of ethnically subject positions in a significant number to subvert the
    racial logic of Britain’s ethnoscapes. Contrary to the more frenzied charges of secularminded
    critics, the emergence of the category of Muslim was not imposed by the multiculturalist
    policies of the British state. Rather, its appearance in the pages of the Runnymede
    report was a reflection of the mobilization that had taken place in Britain against the
    publication of The Satanic Verses in 1989.6
    This mobilization ruptured the immigrant imaginary that had governed the
    settlement and domestication of post-colonial migration to Britain.7 It was a mobilization
    that was itself made possible by the phenomenon throughout the Muslim Ummah, in which
    Kemalist projects were shaken by Islamist advances (Sayyid 2003: 53-83). The
    conceptualization of Islamophobia that began to circulate in the wake of the Runnymede
    report shared a general understanding of racism that was positivist and saw racism as
    primarily a matter of attitudes and beliefs. Thus the report was unable to get across the
    subtlety of its formulation, and as such, Islamophobia emerged as a rather impoverished
    concept, uncertain and unclear about what work it was being asked to do. This enabled those
    who opposed the conceptualization of Islamophobia to see it as a portmanteau expression
    that had little purpose.
    The opposition to Islamophobia has three overlapping strands. Firstly, it is argued
    that Islamophobia is not a valid category, since the phenomena it seeks to describe does not
    exist. That is, there is no significant specific discrimination against Muslims because they are
    Muslims.8 Whatever discrimination or prejudice that may be said to exist against Muslims
    can be explained as racism—pure and simple—and as such does not require a special
    concept. Secondly, there are the set of arguments that maintain the deployment of
    Islamophobia is a means of stifling debate and free expression. In other words,
    Islamophobia is (to use popular expression) seen as another sign of “political correctness
    gone mad”. Thirdly, it is argued that Islamophobia is a legitimate response to the threat, or
    perceptions of threat, produced by the radicalization of a significant number of Muslims.
    What a term comes to mean is related to how it is used, how it is embedded in
    cultural practices and, in other words, the language game played around the term in question.
    For a concept as contested as Islamophobia, this means that the politics around its use are
    14 ISJ 2(1)
    far more visible than the politics around the use of many other terms and an ostensive
    definition would not work. Nor would an approach that seeks to analyze Islamophobia into
    its constituent elements, which is a common way of trying to define a category.9 To have a
    measure of Islamophobia, we need to be able to sketch out the main frontlines in the politics
    evoked by Islamophobia. The politics of Islamophobia are constituted by a struggle between
    the opponents of the concept and its advocates. The opposition to the category straddles the
    conventional differences between left and right. Similarly, the advocates of Islamophobia
    cannot be neatly grouped along pre-existing political allegiances and solidarities: in its ranks
    are included both conservatives and leftists. This rearranging of the normal axis of conflict in
    Western plutocracies, demonstrates the disruptive effect of the disclosure of a Muslim
    political subject position.
    Those who favor the use of the category of Islamophobia argue that Islamophobia is
    a means of describing a situation that would otherwise go unreported and unattended.
    Arguments that support the concept of Islamophobia point to the work done by categories
    such as anti-Semitism and racism in mobilizing opposition to these forms of injustice.
    Islamophobia is then prized as the means by which to suggest a mechanism for the
    reduction of injustice directed at Muslims. Islamophobia is not about the “hatred and fear of
    Islam” or Muslims. The range of activities covered by Islamophobia exceed its common
    formulations; rather it occurs as a response to the problematization of Muslim identity. This
    is similar to the way in which Brian Klug (2013: 474–475) points out that what is important
    is not that anti-Semitism is simply an expression of intense hostility toward Jews or Judaism,
    but rather what is at stake is that anti-Semitism defines Jewishness in such way that it
    impoverishes the ability of those designated as Jews to elaborate their sense of what it means
    to be Jewish. Similarly, more than an expression of hatred or fear, Islamophobia needs to be
    understood as an undermining of the ability of Muslims as Muslims, to project themselves
    into the future. The manner in which Islamophobia is expressed and made manifest are
    diverse. This makes it difficult to say that Islamophobia has one specific feature that is
    hidden behind all its various occurrences. There is no essence to Islamophobia; instead there
    is a series of overlapping elements that constitute a coherence based around a notion of what
    Wittgenstein described as a family resemblance. 10 It is possible to see how a gesture, a
    speech, and a police action can all be aspects of Islamophobia reflecting not an underlying
    unity, but a series of overlapping similarities. Thus the definition that this article introduces
    is to see Islamophobia through the range of its deployments, rather than through its
    purported essence or its constituent elements. The various ways in which Islamophobia is
    used to describe situations are conditioned by the specific cultural, socioeconomic and
    historical factors that have influenced the way in which Islam can be performed.
    The performance of Islam is staged in four distinct theaters (Sayyid, 2010: 3). Firstly,
    there is Muslimistan, which is a group of countries socially and culturally dominated, either
    informally or formally, by the Islamicate. For all practical purposes, this means countries in
    which a very large percentage of the population would define themselves as Muslim.11 Very
    often Islam would have some constitutional privilege accorded to it; for example, Islam
    defined as a state religion. Muslimistan approximates the membership of the Organization of
    Islamic Cooperation (OIC) with one or two anomalies, such as the inclusion of
    Mozambique, but the exclusion of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The second theater is formed by
    territories in which Muslims are a clear minority, marginal to the national narrative, even
    though their presence is simultaneous to or predates the formation of the state; for example,
    the Muslim populations of India, Russia, China and Thailand. The third theater where
    Islamophobia is performed, is in territories where Muslims are represented mainly as

    1. 👍 0
    2. 👎 0
  6. i need paraphrasing and sumurasing and auoting this article a measure of islamophobia by s.sayyid

    1. 👍 0
    2. 👎 0

Respond to this Question

First Name

Your Response

Similar Questions

  1. English help

    1. In a citation within a Works Cited page, which of the following should NOT be in italics? A. the title of a book B. the title of an editorial********* C. the title of an encyclopedia 2. You finished writing a research paper on

    asked by Cassie on April 27, 2014
  2. English

    Which of the following statements is true of a summary? article. topic. A. A summary condenses the main points of an article. B. A summary is quicker and easier to write than a longer original C. A summary should not include

    asked by Angela on April 15, 2014
  3. physics

    Hello everyone, I need help with this question: A dart gun is fired while being held horizontally at a height of 1.00m above ground level and while it is at rest relative to the ground. The dart from the gun travels a horizontal

    asked by Leo on September 4, 2012
  4. Physics

    In a friendly neighborhood squirt gun contest a participant runs at 7.8 m/s horizontally off the back deck and fires her squirt gun in the plane of her motion but 45' above horizontal. The gun can shoot water at 11 m/s relative to

    asked by Kris on October 9, 2017
  5. English

    What are the two ways that a writer can use internal or in-text citations? A.Works cited and prepositional phrase B.Signaling phrase and parenthetical citation C.Absolute phrase and plagiarism citation D.Documentation and works

    asked by Mya on April 26, 2017
  1. English help please

    2. You finished writing a research paper on the way modern technology affects communication within families. Now you need to include the citation for an editorial published in the Sacramento Gazette titled “Should We Just Text

    asked by Cassie on April 28, 2014
  2. English

    Which of the following statements is true of a summary? 1. A summary condenses the main points of an article. 2. A summary is quicker and easier to write than a longer original article. 3. A summary should not include evaluation

    asked by Lin on October 21, 2008
  3. english

    Which of the following is NOT true of an in-text citation? A basic in-text citation consists of the source author’s last name and page to show the source of the direct quote The page number has the word “page” or “p.”

    asked by Robb4301 on February 2, 2015
  4. physics

    A gun is mounted at the top of light house of height h. A similar gun is mounted in the boat in the sea. Both the guns can fire shots with speed upto under root 2gk, where k>h. What will be the area in which gun at the top can be

    asked by Tillu on July 26, 2011
  5. English

    If there is no known author for a source, the in-text citation and the full citation on the Reference page should start with the date. True False I say false.

    asked by Tim on October 1, 2016

You can view more similar questions or ask a new question.