We may observe, that there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators. This species of reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe, that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction; it is evident, that we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favour of human testimony, whose connexion with any event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any other.

Question

We may observe, that there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators. This species of reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe, that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction; it is evident, that we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favour of human testimony, whose connexion with any event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any other.

Hume, D., An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Hackett, 1977), p. 74

(a) Standardize the argument (hint: it consists of one premise and a conclusion)

(b) Hume’s argument above, that testimony is justified on the basis of inductive inference, constituted the generally accepted account of testimonial justification until the 1970s when it was famously observed that the argument potentially commits the fallacy of circularity. Explain how Hume’s argument is circular.

Answer 1

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Answer 2

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Answer 3

(a) The argument presented by Hume can be standardized as follows:

Premise 1: Our assurance in any argument based on testimony is derived from our observation of the veracity of human testimony and the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses.
Conclusion: Therefore, testimony is a reliable form of reasoning.

(b) Hume's argument is circular because it relies on the assumption that human testimony is reliable in order to support the claim that human testimony is reliable.

The argument assumes that our assurance in testimony is derived from our observation of the veracity of human testimony and the conformity of facts to witness reports. However, this assumption presupposes the reliability of human testimony, which is what the argument is trying to establish in the first place.

In other words, Hume's argument uses the reliability of testimony as evidence for the reliability of testimony. This circular reasoning fails to provide a solid justification for why we should trust testimony as a form of reasoning.