I'm having trouble finding the answers to these questions (the answers should be in order from the article, it's just not clarifiable. Also, I put ****** .... ***** to show where the answers may be that I think is right, but I'm not sure)...
2. How does James Madison define a ‘faction’?
4. What possible solutions does Madison see to solving the problem of factions? Why does he rule out most of these possible solutions?
5. What is Madison’s solution to dealing with a faction that consists of a majority of citizens?
7. Why does Madison think the large size of our country and various levels of federal and state governments are good things that will help with the problem of factions?
___________________________________
The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
Author: James Madison
To the People of the State of New York:
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. ****** The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. *********The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. *********It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other.******* These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.
***************By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.***********
The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution.**************** When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. *************
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual.
************A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.**************
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended. ***********It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. *************The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. ************ Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. ********* [[[[[[[[[[Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,--is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.]]]]]]
I don't understand question 7 but I think I answered the other two right.
4.)
• In order to get rid of factions, Madison wants to destroy liberty. His other possible solution was making sure everyone thinks the same thing. However, he rules out most of these solutions because he knows people fought for liberty and to take it away will do nothing but cause more problems. The other solution for everyone having the same opinions is not going to happen because not everyone is going to think the same thing on certain issues.
5.) His solutions to dealing with a faction consisting of a majority of citizens is to make sure those citizens do not have the ability to turn their opinions into a set action.
7.)
7. *************The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. ************ Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. *********
The very last part where it's in brackets [[[[[ .... ]]]]]] I don't think is relevant in the questions. I didn't find info there.
Is this right for #2)
James defines a faction by saying it is where there are a lot of citizens who are united by a common ground of interest and are unfavorable to other citizen’s rights and the passions of the whole community.
Yes, that's good for # 2.
Is this right? and is 4 & 5 correct?
7.) Madison thinks widening the country allows for the incoming of different parties who have different interests. If the society is smaller, then the reality of the situation will be difficult because everyone would not be able to discover their own skill or advantage and act together on some common ground with each other.
To find the answers to the questions, we need to analyze the text provided. Let's break down each question and locate the corresponding information in the text:
2. How does James Madison define a ‘faction’?
To find the definition of a 'faction,' we can look for the paragraph where Madison defines it. In this case, it is located in the text starting with the sentence, "By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."
4. What possible solutions does Madison see to solving the problem of factions? Why does he rule out most of these possible solutions?
To find the possible solutions mentioned by Madison, we can look for the paragraph where he discusses them. In this case, it is located in the text starting with the sentence, "There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects." As for why he rules out most of these possible solutions, we can analyze the text and find reasons within the same paragraph.
5. What is Madison’s solution to dealing with a faction that consists of a majority of citizens?
To find Madison's solution to dealing with a faction that consists of a majority of citizens, we can look for the paragraph where he discusses it. In this case, it is located in the text starting with the sentence, "If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote." The solution should be mentioned in the following sentences.
7. Why does Madison think the large size of our country and various levels of federal and state governments are good things that will help with the problem of factions?
To find Madison's reasoning on why the large size of the country and the various levels of federal and state governments are beneficial, we can look for the paragraph where he discusses it. In this case, it is located in the text starting with the sentence, "The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter." The reasoning should be mentioned in the following sentences.
By using the provided information and locating the relevant paragraphs in the text, we should be able to find the answers to the questions.