How so I write a summary for Gun Control Losing Ground with an in-text citation.
Here are some good sites on in-text citations and summary writing.
http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/560/02/
http://www.monash.edu.au/lls/llonline/writing/general/essay/sample-essay/index.xml
http://homepage.smc.edu/reading_lab/writing_a_summary.htm
http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:-mMrGTx1YWkJ:www.sa.sdsu.edu/dss/summary.pdf+writing+a+summary&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESiDXzyej0VBMTB-Zak-LT3BqBpvUq-YN2fe-7rNgY7Y6r7bBg9e-U3Bdrmmp6xcybKJ4O5zwJct6Oy5vA4j6rWXVD5npfRRMWOQCncKzixPrf9dNTc42ty28s_Sfge8yN9YiSsE&sig=AHIEtbS8Kuw1AeoTVlO1chES482nEkWHtQ
Here are some excellent instructional webpages to help you.
http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/563/01/
http://wps.ablongman.com/long_behrens_saw_1/0,5312,86390-,00.html
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How to write an in-text citation depends on whether you are to use MLA or APA format. Let me know which one you have been assigned to use.
I want to learn how to format question task to teach summarizing and paraphrasing.
If I were fierce, and bald, and short of breath,
I’d live with scarlet Majors at the Base,
And speed glum heroes up the line to death.
You’d see me with my puffy petulant face,
Guzzling and gulping in the best hotel,
Reading the Roll of Honour. ‘Poor young chap,’
I’d say—‘I used to know his father well;
Yes, we’ve lost heavily in this last scrap.’
And when the war is done and youth stone dead,
I’d toddle safely home and die—in bed.
The growing literature on Islamophobia is dominated by empirical studies, the
analysis of media representations and socio-psychological approaches, while many of these
studies have been valuable in illustrating the range of expressions of Islamophobia; they have
been less successful in understanding the phenomena, and mapping its relationship with
other forms of discriminatory practices such as racism and anti-Semitism. This article
presents a conceptual examination of the category of Islamophobia and the work it is called
upon to do in contemporary debates, as prelude to a discussion about what a theorization of
this concept could contribute to the field of social analysis and policy.
INTRODUCTION
There is a film that I saw once or twice called Things to Do in Denver When You’re Dead
(1995). Maybe it was an in-flight movie or on late night TV. What I remember about it,
though, is the criminal argot that the filmmakers invented for the demimonde characters of
the movie to use. This decision to invent a new slang always struck me as rather curious,
since there already exists a rich and well-known slang familiar to audiences of American
gangster movies.1 So why did the filmmakers think it was worthwhile investing in a new
vocabulary? The invention of a vocabulary is only useful if it does some work, in other
words, if it makes some difference to our practice, if it allows us to say and do things that we
could not do previously. The invention of a gangster argot specific to Things to Do in Denver
has the effect of placing the movie in a kind of never-never land of crime, turning a rather
mundane story into something like a parable or a myth, in which Denver is not really an
identifiable place and the characters not really people. In the world of Things to Do in Denver
When You’re Dead there is phrase that characters use frequently: “Give it a name…”. This
phrase is used as means of demanding an answer for any query.
Islamophobia is a concept that emerges precisely to do the work that categories like
racism were not doing. It names something that needs to be named. Its continual circulation
in public debate testifies to ways in which it hints at something that needs to be addressed.
What it names, of course, remains a matter of dispute. This dispute has two sources:
philosophical and political. By philosophical I mean that there is lack of clarity about the
concept of Islamophobia. Any review of the growing literature on Islamophobia will show
that it is dominated by empirical studies, by analysis of media representations and sociopsychological
approaches. These ontic studies of Islamophobia do not (and cannot address)
the ontology of the category. They cannot provide us with a theoretical clarification. By
political I mean that the dispute about Islamophobia is not due to simply its conceptual lack
of clarity, but also with the way it appears in a contested field where questions about national
security, social cohesion and cultural belonging are played out. It is this field in which the
relationship between national majorities and the post-colonial, ethnically marked minorities
is being forged.
12 ISJ 2(1)
In other words, Islamophobia is rejected not only because there may be a
disagreement about whether a particular practice or behavior meets the criterion of what
constitutes Islamophobia, but also because there is a dispute that any such behavior could be
considered to be Islamophobic, because the concept of Islamophobia lacks any validity. In
what follows, I want to address what kind of phenomena are brought forth by giving them
the name of Islamophobia, and what a theorization of this concept could contribute to the
field of social analysis and policy.
The tension between policy and philosophy is expressed in a number of ways in
social sciences: there is the common assertion that policy and philosophy belong to two
distinct realms in which the abstract reasoning and complicated language of philosophers has
nothing to add to the work of practical men and women dealing with complex social
problems.
In this article I want to focus on one aspect of this general problem: that is, the
production of “action-able knowledge”, which is knowledge that policy makers, with
sufficient political will and resources, could use to make things better. This is similar in a way
to the classic “mirror for princes” literature, which existed in various historical civilizations,
for example, Hellenic, Sinic and Indic. To give advice to the prince was the province of the
philosopher, who would educate the prince in how to exercise what could be described as
something akin to good governance. This conjoining of the speculative with the practical is
what Aristotle described as phronesis. It is as contribution to phronetic social science that this
examination of Islamophobia should be seen.2 Specifically, I want to sketch out some of the
possible ways in which we account for Islamophobia so that the exercise of accounting
would be a prelude to its reduction.
DEFINING ISLAMOPHOBIA
Discussions about the legitimacy of Islamophobia take place in the context of
various mobilizations and confrontations centered on the figure of the Muslim. These range
from the series of “moral panics” that seem to regularly sweep over mainly Western
plutocracies, but also other places in the world in which some cherished universal (or
Western) values are threatened by the actions of Muslims (or their extremist fringes). These
are values—such as the freedom of expression, gender equality or tolerance—most often
brought into play as being threatened by actions of “some” Muslims.3
As a term, Islamophobia has a number of iterations: more consistently developed in
French, in the colonial context and around the 1920s in particular. It appears somewhat
more sporadically as used in English, with the occasional reference, such as Edward Said’s
1985 reconsideration of Orientalism, before its enduring appearance in 1997 in the
Runnymede report. The latter makes no reference to its early formulations, giving the
impression that it is a neologism without any historical depth and completely inspired by the
contingencies of “race relations” in Britain.4 In particular, the context for the report is given
as mobilizations against the publication of The Satanic Verses and the emergence of a Muslim
political subject. Conventional uses of Islamophobia, at least in the Anglophonic world,
follow the lead of the Runnymede Trust report of 1997. The concept of Islamophobia that
appeared in its pages was one that was defined in terms of eight constituent parts. These
components ranged from perceptions of Islam as an unchanging monolith, to the view of its
inherent violent nature and its fundamental inferiority to the West. Six of the eight
components refer to Islam, and the other two refer to Muslims. Muslims are seen as subject
to Islamophobia primarily through the transference of hostility to Islam and the
13
naturalization of that hostility. This definition combines insights from the critique of
Orientalism (in particular the Orientalist characterization of Islam) to ideas of racism in
Britain that focus on the unjust discriminatory practices directed at ethnically subordinated
socio-historical groups. It is possible to read in the Runnymede report, a conceptualization
of Islamophobia as a product of the articulation between Orientalism and racism. The report
does this by surreptitiously (and perhaps inadvertently) confirming the emergence of new
political subjectivity into the discourse of British race relations: Muslim. By translating
hostility to Islam into an hostility against those described as Muslims in contemporary
society, one can see in the report an implicit recognition of the racialization of Muslims.5
Scholars of racism had already moved to the understanding that racism was not
predicated on the existence of race as understood in primarily biological terms, but rather
that race was the product of the process of racialization. As such, a mix of elements
including histories, cultures, geographies and bodies were articulated to forge “race” as the
condition of possibility of the exercise of racism. The radicality of the Runnymede report
was to point to the way in which religious affiliation could be a sufficient source of group
formation. In the context of Britain’s ethnoscape, which by the time of the publication of
the report had come to be organized around three principal subject positions—White, Black
and Asian—the introduction of a Muslim identity was disruptive. Muslims could be found
along all the spectrum of ethnically subject positions in a significant number to subvert the
racial logic of Britain’s ethnoscapes. Contrary to the more frenzied charges of secularminded
critics, the emergence of the category of Muslim was not imposed by the multiculturalist
policies of the British state. Rather, its appearance in the pages of the Runnymede
report was a reflection of the mobilization that had taken place in Britain against the
publication of The Satanic Verses in 1989.6
This mobilization ruptured the immigrant imaginary that had governed the
settlement and domestication of post-colonial migration to Britain.7 It was a mobilization
that was itself made possible by the phenomenon throughout the Muslim Ummah, in which
Kemalist projects were shaken by Islamist advances (Sayyid 2003: 53-83). The
conceptualization of Islamophobia that began to circulate in the wake of the Runnymede
report shared a general understanding of racism that was positivist and saw racism as
primarily a matter of attitudes and beliefs. Thus the report was unable to get across the
subtlety of its formulation, and as such, Islamophobia emerged as a rather impoverished
concept, uncertain and unclear about what work it was being asked to do. This enabled those
who opposed the conceptualization of Islamophobia to see it as a portmanteau expression
that had little purpose.
The opposition to Islamophobia has three overlapping strands. Firstly, it is argued
that Islamophobia is not a valid category, since the phenomena it seeks to describe does not
exist. That is, there is no significant specific discrimination against Muslims because they are
Muslims.8 Whatever discrimination or prejudice that may be said to exist against Muslims
can be explained as racism—pure and simple—and as such does not require a special
concept. Secondly, there are the set of arguments that maintain the deployment of
Islamophobia is a means of stifling debate and free expression. In other words,
Islamophobia is (to use popular expression) seen as another sign of “political correctness
gone mad”. Thirdly, it is argued that Islamophobia is a legitimate response to the threat, or
perceptions of threat, produced by the radicalization of a significant number of Muslims.
What a term comes to mean is related to how it is used, how it is embedded in
cultural practices and, in other words, the language game played around the term in question.
For a concept as contested as Islamophobia, this means that the politics around its use are
14 ISJ 2(1)
far more visible than the politics around the use of many other terms and an ostensive
definition would not work. Nor would an approach that seeks to analyze Islamophobia into
its constituent elements, which is a common way of trying to define a category.9 To have a
measure of Islamophobia, we need to be able to sketch out the main frontlines in the politics
evoked by Islamophobia. The politics of Islamophobia are constituted by a struggle between
the opponents of the concept and its advocates. The opposition to the category straddles the
conventional differences between left and right. Similarly, the advocates of Islamophobia
cannot be neatly grouped along pre-existing political allegiances and solidarities: in its ranks
are included both conservatives and leftists. This rearranging of the normal axis of conflict in
Western plutocracies, demonstrates the disruptive effect of the disclosure of a Muslim
political subject position.
Those who favor the use of the category of Islamophobia argue that Islamophobia is
a means of describing a situation that would otherwise go unreported and unattended.
Arguments that support the concept of Islamophobia point to the work done by categories
such as anti-Semitism and racism in mobilizing opposition to these forms of injustice.
Islamophobia is then prized as the means by which to suggest a mechanism for the
reduction of injustice directed at Muslims. Islamophobia is not about the “hatred and fear of
Islam” or Muslims. The range of activities covered by Islamophobia exceed its common
formulations; rather it occurs as a response to the problematization of Muslim identity. This
is similar to the way in which Brian Klug (2013: 474–475) points out that what is important
is not that anti-Semitism is simply an expression of intense hostility toward Jews or Judaism,
but rather what is at stake is that anti-Semitism defines Jewishness in such way that it
impoverishes the ability of those designated as Jews to elaborate their sense of what it means
to be Jewish. Similarly, more than an expression of hatred or fear, Islamophobia needs to be
understood as an undermining of the ability of Muslims as Muslims, to project themselves
into the future. The manner in which Islamophobia is expressed and made manifest are
diverse. This makes it difficult to say that Islamophobia has one specific feature that is
hidden behind all its various occurrences. There is no essence to Islamophobia; instead there
is a series of overlapping elements that constitute a coherence based around a notion of what
Wittgenstein described as a family resemblance. 10 It is possible to see how a gesture, a
speech, and a police action can all be aspects of Islamophobia reflecting not an underlying
unity, but a series of overlapping similarities. Thus the definition that this article introduces
is to see Islamophobia through the range of its deployments, rather than through its
purported essence or its constituent elements. The various ways in which Islamophobia is
used to describe situations are conditioned by the specific cultural, socioeconomic and
historical factors that have influenced the way in which Islam can be performed.
The performance of Islam is staged in four distinct theaters (Sayyid, 2010: 3). Firstly,
there is Muslimistan, which is a group of countries socially and culturally dominated, either
informally or formally, by the Islamicate. For all practical purposes, this means countries in
which a very large percentage of the population would define themselves as Muslim.11 Very
often Islam would have some constitutional privilege accorded to it; for example, Islam
defined as a state religion. Muslimistan approximates the membership of the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) with one or two anomalies, such as the inclusion of
Mozambique, but the exclusion of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The second theater is formed by
territories in which Muslims are a clear minority, marginal to the national narrative, even
though their presence is simultaneous to or predates the formation of the state; for example,
the Muslim populations of India, Russia, China and Thailand. The third theater where
Islamophobia is performed, is in territories where Muslims are represented mainly as
i need paraphrasing and sumurasing and auoting this article a measure of islamophobia by s.sayyid
To write a summary for an article titled "Gun Control Losing Ground" with an in-text citation, you can follow these steps:
1. Read the article: Begin by thoroughly reading the article "Gun Control Losing Ground" to understand its main points, arguments, and supporting evidence.
2. Identify the main ideas: Determine the primary arguments and key points made by the author. Pay attention to statistics, studies, and examples presented in the article.
3. Start the summary: Begin your summary by briefly introducing the article and its author. For example, "In the article 'Gun Control Losing Ground,' written by [Author's Name], the author discusses the growing challenges faced by proponents of gun control."
4. Summarize the main points: Present a concise summary of the main arguments and ideas presented in the article. Use your own words to capture the essence of each point. It is essential to avoid personal bias or adding your own opinions. Keep it objective and unbiased.
5. Write the in-text citation: After the summary, include an in-text citation to acknowledge the source of the information. The format of the citation may vary, depending on the required citation style (e.g., APA, MLA, Chicago). Here's an example for an APA-style citation: (Author's Last Name, Year, p. Page Number). Remember to consult the specific guidelines provided by your instructor or institution.
6. Revise and edit: Review your summary to ensure accuracy, coherence, and clarity. Make necessary revisions for a concise yet comprehensive summary. Avoid any form of plagiarism by accurately summarizing the source material in your own words.
7. Provide a complete reference: After the summary and in-text citation, remember to include a complete reference for the article in the required citation style. This should include information such as the author's name, title of the article, source, publication date, and any other required elements.
By following these steps, you can write a summary for "Gun Control Losing Ground" with an in-text citation, while also ensuring proper academic integrity.