Saturday

July 4, 2015

July 4, 2015

Total # Posts: 7

**managerial economics**

A firm offers two differentiated products, X and Y and faces two types of consumers, types A and B. There are equal numbers of each type of consumers ¡V so, for simplicity, assume there is just one of each type. The valuations of the two types of customers of the two ...
*September 8, 2008*

**managerial economics**

A firm offers two differentiated products, X and Y and faces two types of consumers, types A and B. There are equal numbers of each type of consumers ¡V so, for simplicity, assume there is just one of each type. The valuations of the two types of customers of the two ...
*September 8, 2008*

**managerial economics**

A firm offers two differentiated products, X and Y and faces two types of consumers, types A and B. There are equal numbers of each type of consumers ¡V so, for simplicity, assume there is just one of each type. The valuations of the two types of customers of the two ...
*September 7, 2008*

**managerial economics**

BigBook is a monopolist book publishing company, which sells books in Australia and New Zealand. Assume there is a 1:1 exchange rate between Australia and New Zealand. The inverse demand equations for Australia and New Zealand are as follows: Australia: PA = 100 - 2.5QA New ...
*September 7, 2008*

**managerial economics**

Players A and B are playing a simultaneous moves game and both can choose either strategy S1 or strategy S2. If both choose S1 both receive 0. If both choose S2 both receive -2. If their chosen strategies differ they both receive -4. (a)Write out a table representing each ...
*September 7, 2008*

**managerial economics**

Consider the one-shot, simultaneous move game below, and answer the accompanying questions: Player & Strategy Firm B Left Right Firm A Up 4,4 0,0 Down 0,0 2,2 (a)List the strategies for Firm A and Firm B (b)State the set of strategy profiles. (c)Suppose Firm A plays Up. What ...
*September 7, 2008*

**managerial economics**

Problem One5 Consider the following simultaneous moves game in normal form: Player Two t1 t2 Player One r1 -2,4 0,-2 r2 -4,5 0,1 (a)State the set of Nash equilibrium strategies. (b)State the payoffs to each player in the Nash equilibrium.
*September 7, 2008*

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