I need to explain how this argument could be constructed as circular,

the argument is

[W]e may observe, that there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators. This species of reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe, that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction; it is evident, that we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favour of human testimony, whose connexion with any event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any other.

What I have is that in the argument he uses testimony and observation to support his argument, but I don't think that that is right

First, this argument is not very clearly stated as written. The poit seems to be that observation and testimony depend on the inferences and "connections" in the mind of the observer/testator. That is a maxim, yes. Are they reliable? The author seems to contend that observation and testimony about that observation are inherently unreliable. They are unreliable only if one accepts the stated maxim, or so it seems to me, so the question remains unanswered. I think it is a circuitous argument. First he says that observation and testimony are useful, common, and necessary. He ends by saying they are "as little necessary as any other." What do you think?

I went over the argument and separated it into different parts, and from that I got

1)There is no reasoning more useful/common that testimony

2)Some say testimony is not be founded on the relation of cause and effect

3)It’s good enough to notice that out promise in this argument is taken from no other way of thinking than our testimony of the truth of human testimony and the usual conformity of facts to the testimony

4)It being a general true statement that no objects have and observable connection together and that all the guesses which we can draw from one another are founded only on out experiences and their constant and regular conjunction.

5)It’s obvious that we shouldn’t make an exception to this true statement in favor of human testimony, whose connection with any even seems, in itself as little necessary as any other.

I've tried connecting this to a circular argument but I'm having difficulty doing so.

I see that it says that testimony isnt based on connections, but the says that a true statement is no objects have observable connections, and all guesses are founded only from our experiences and their constant and regular connections, but then says we shouldn't make an exception to the stated true statement for human testimony which the connections that are little necessary,

I think you broke the argument down quite nicely. What I read is that he seems to debunk the argument or maxim that human observation and testimony is reliable, then circles back around to say that testimony seems "as little necessary as any other." Any other what? Is all evidence "little necessary"? If so, then testimony is as valuable as any other evidence, so he's back at square one. In your repost above you've changed the wording of the conclusion, which may change it's meaning.

To identify whether the argument is circular, you need to check if it falls into a circular reasoning fallacy, also known as a begging the question fallacy.

Circular reasoning occurs when the conclusion of an argument is assumed in one of the premises. In other words, the argument assumes what it is trying to prove. Let's break down and analyze the argument to determine if it is circular:

The argument starts by stating that reasoning based on the testimony of men and reports of eye-witnesses is common, useful, and necessary. The author argues that our assurance in this kind of reasoning comes from observing the veracity of human testimony and the usual conformity of facts to witness reports.

Although the argument acknowledges that this reasoning may not be based on cause and effect, it asserts that our assurance relies on the observation of human testimony. However, the argument does not provide any evidence or support for the claim that human testimony is veracious or reliable.

Here is a potential way to explain how the argument could be circular:

The argument assumes that human testimony is trustworthy because it claims that our assurance relies on the observation of the veracity of human testimony. However, the argument does not provide any evidence or justification for the claim that human testimony is, in fact, trustworthy. It simply asserts that our assurance is derived from this observation. This creates a circular reasoning pattern where the argument assumes the reliability of human testimony to support its conclusion, without offering independent evidence for this assumption.

In summary, the argument could be considered circular because it assumes the reliability of human testimony as a premise without providing sufficient evidence or justification for this assumption.