What argument Williams offer in defense of a physical criterion of personal identity that Parfit critiques. did whether Parfit succeeds in answering Williams.

To understand the argument Williams offers in defense of a physical criterion of personal identity and Parfit's critique, we need to first establish the context. Derek Parfit was a renowned philosopher who wrote extensively on personal identity, particularly in his book "Reasons and Persons." In this book, Parfit critiques various theories of personal identity, including the physical criterion defended by Bernard Williams.

Williams argues for a physical criterion of personal identity, which holds that a person at one time is identical to a person at another time only if they share the same body. In other words, our continued existence as the same person relies on our physical continuity.

Parfit, on the other hand, presents his own theory called "the psychological criterion." According to Parfit, personal identity is not determined by physical continuity, but rather by psychological connectedness and continuity of memory, desires, beliefs, and character traits. Parfit argues that our personal identity can persist even if our physical bodies change.

In critiquing Williams' physical criterion, Parfit suggests that it raises troubling implications. He presents various thought experiments to illustrate this, such as the teletransportation scenario or the fission scenario. These scenarios challenge the idea that personal identity is solely dependent on physical continuity.

Parfit argues that Williams' physical criterion undermines our intuition that personal identity lies in psychological connectedness and continuity. Parfit offers a thought experiment where an individual's brain is duplicated, and the duplicate has the same psychological characteristics as the original. Parfit suggests that the duplicate would have the same personal identity as the original, despite not sharing physical continuity.

In essence, Parfit aims to show that a physical criterion is insufficient in capturing the complexities of personal identity. He suggests that psychological continuity is a more plausible criterion, as it allows for the possibility of personal identity persisting through changes in the physical body.

In evaluating whether Parfit succeeds in answering Williams, it is important to recognize that different philosophers may have differing viewpoints on this matter. Some may argue that Parfit's critique successfully challenges the limitations of a purely physical criterion, while others may contend that Williams' defense of physical continuity still holds merit.

Overall, exploring the arguments put forth by both Williams and Parfit can provide a deeper understanding of the ongoing philosophical discourse on personal identity.