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Post a New Question | Current Questions | Chat With Live Tutors
Posted by eric on Monday, September 10, 2007 at 9:43am.
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Homework Help Forum: math
Current Questions | Post a New Question | Answer this Question | Further Reading
Posted by eric on Monday, September 10, 2007 at 9:42am in response to math.
download mp3 free instrumental remix
ahh !@#$%^& son, i see wat u mean
Two people have 10 dollars to divide between themselves. they use the following procedure. each person names a number of dollars (nonnegative integer), at most equal to 10. IF the sum of the amounts that the people name exceeds 10 and the amounts named are different, then the person who named the smaller amount receives that amount and the other person receives the remaining money. if the sum of the amounts that the people name exceeds 10 and the amounts are the same, each person receives 5 dollars. determine the best response of each player to each of the other players' actions and thus find the nash equilibria
I need to know how this answer is gotten, so plz show or tell me how work done
players : two individuals
actions : each players' set of actions is the set of effort levels (non negative numbers)
preferences : player i's pereferences are representede by the payoff function Ai(c+Aj-Ai)
To find the nash equilibria we can construct and analyze the players best response functions. given Aj, in dividual i's payoff is a quadratic function of Ai that is zero when Ai=0 and when Ai=C+Aj, and reaches a maximum in between. the symmetry of quadratic functions implies that the best response of each individual i to
Aj is Bi(Aj) = 1/2(C+Aj)
if u know calc, you can reach the same conclusion by setting the derivative of player i's payoff with respect to Ai equal to zero.
For Further Re
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- math, economics, game theory - eric, Monday, September 10, 2007 at 9:46am
Two people have 10 dollars to divide between themselves. they use the following procedure. each person names a number of dollars(nonnegative integer) at most equal to 10. if the sum of the amounts that the people name is at most 10, then each person receives the amount of money she named and remainder is destroyed. if the sum of the amounts that the people name exceeds 10 and the amounts named are different, then the person who named the smaller amount receives that amount and the other person receives the reemaining money. if the sum of the amounts that the people name exceeds 10 and the am ounts named are the same, then each person receives 5 dollars. determine the best response of each player to each of the other players' actions to find the nash equilibria.
a guideline on how the book says to do this is posted in the previous question i did about this...just scroll down a bit to MATH-eric
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- math, economics, game theory - economyst, Monday, September 10, 2007 at 11:32am
First of all, Nash Equilibrium analyses are pretty advanced stuff. I understand the basics. However, I could be out of my league with anything advanced. Especially if you want to apply some differential function (calculas) to possible responses as you suggest in your earlier post.
As you probably have discovered, the hard part to a nash equilibria is deciding what the other guy's initial position will be. Once that's done, everything falls into place.
I need to think about this problem some more.
Sorry for the lack of specifics, and lottsa luck.
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- math, economics, game theory - eric, Monday, September 10, 2007 at 4:29pm
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hmm...thanks, those are along the same lines as my thoughts, which is not helpful for turning this problem into my prof @_@
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- math, economics, game theory - Marieanne, Sunday, November 30, 2008 at 12:35am
1) If C = 1000 + 7/8[GDP-1000], I = 700 and G = 1000 and the economy is currently in equilibrium at 400 below full employment GDP, the correct fiscal policy would be to increase G by?
2) If C = 500 + 3/4[GDP- 100], I = 300, G = 400, Xn =- 10 and full employment GDP is 210 less than current GDP, the proper action would be to increase taxes by?
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- math, economics, game theory - Kyle, Friday, April 3, 2009 at 2:59pm
- math, economics, game theory - Joe, Monday, August 10, 2009 at 12:26am
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If C = 500 + 3/4[GDP- 100], I = 300, G = 400, Xn =- 10 and full employment GDP is 210 less than current GDP, the proper action would be to increase taxes by?
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- Economics - Mitchell, Thursday, August 20, 2009 at 2:38am
1) GDP=14600
2) GDP=1360 ,but I do not know what it means "the proper action would be to increase taxes by."
Can you let me know the answer for #2.
Thanks,
Mitchell
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